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1989] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
It is hoped that the discussion of these issues in The Survey
will be of interest and assistance to the bench and bar.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Rogers-Bartolomeo rule is not triggered by an out-of-state pend-
ing charge
In New York, a criminal defendant represented by counsel
may not be questioned in the absence of his attorney' unless he
waives his right to counsel in the presence of his attorney.2 Under
1 People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666
(1968). The Arthur court held that such questioning would constitute a "deprivation of a
fundamental constitutional right." Id. The right to counsel during interrogations is
"grounded in this State's constitutional and statutory guarantees of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the right to the assistance of counsel, and due process of law." People v.
Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (1976). Developing
independently of the right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution, see U.S. CONST. amend. VI, the right to counsel under the New York
Constitution, see N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 6, often provides greater protection for defendants
than its federal counterpart. See e.g., Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 348 N.E.2d at 897, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 422; see also People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560,
508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986) ("Although State courts may not circumscribe rights guaran-
teed by the Federal Constitution, they may interpret their own law to supplement or expand
them"), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
In addition to providing the accused with legal advice at a crucial time, an attorney's
presence at police interrogations can deter unlawful police conduct and coercion, as well as
ensure the accuracy and trustworthiness of statements made by the accused. 31 N.Y. JUR.
2D Criminal Law § 41, at 159 (1983). Furthermore, the presence of counsel during police
questioning "serves to equalize the positions of the accused and sovereign, mitigating the
coercive influence of the State and rendering it less overwhelming." People v. Rogers, 48
N.Y.2d 167, 173, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 22 (1979).
Once the "critical stage" of a criminal proceeding is reached, this indelible right to
counsel attaches regardless of whether the defendant has requested counsel, and the police
may then no longer question the defendant unless he waives counsel in his attorney's pres-
ence. People v. Rowell, 59 N.Y.2d 727, 730, 450 N.E.2d 232, 233, 463 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427
(1983). This right attaches upon the commencement of a criminal action or upon "signifi-
cant judicial activity." See People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 221, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 1345-46,
424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (1980); People v. Simpson, 125 App. Div. 2d 347, 347-48, 508
N.Y.S.2d 613, 614-15 (2d Dep't 1986). Even if the police have not commenced a formal
criminal action, a defendant's retention of an attorney on a criminal matter invokes his right
not to be questioned on the matter outside his attorney's presence. See People v. Skinner,
52 N.Y.2d 24, 31-32, 417 N.E.2d 501, 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (1980). A defendant's re-
quest for counsel is sufficient to trigger this right. People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203,
205, 400 N.E.2d 360, 361, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (1980).
2 Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. By requiring that a
defendant's attorney be present for a valid waiver, the Court of Appeals has sought to en-
sure that the "waiver of a constitutional right [is] competent, intelligent and voluntary."
Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. This requirement "sim-
ply recognizes the right and need of an individual to have a competent advocate at his or
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New York's Rogers-Bartolomeo rule,3 once the police are apprised
of the fact that a defendant is represented by counsel in a pending
criminal action, he cannot be questioned without his attorney be-
ing present-even as to subsequent unrelated charges. 4 This rule
cannot be circumvented by the willful blindness of the police:
When the police have actual knowledge of an unrelated pending
charge against a defendant, they have an affirmative obligation to
her side in dealing with the State." Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d at 29, 417 N.E.2d at 503, 436
N.Y.S.2d at 209.
3 Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18; People v. Bartolomeo, 53
N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981). The holdings of these two cases are
collectively referred to as the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule. See, e.g., People v. Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d
111, 116, 480 N.E.2d 61, 64-65, 490 N.Y.S.2d 475, 478-79 (1985) (rule recognized as "so-
called indelible right to counsel as enunciated by this court in People v. Rogers .. .and
People v. Bartolomeo").
4 Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22. The Rogers court
reasoned that "it would be to ignore reality to deny the role of counsel when the particular
episode of questioning does not concern the pending charge." Id. The court in Rogers also
noted that an attorney would not necessarily "abandon" his client during police questioning
concerning an unrelated charge and that the defendant's attorney, rather than the state,
should determine whether the questioning concerns an unrelated matter. Id. Subsequent
Court of Appeals decisions have emphasized the Rogers court's concern with protecting the
defendant's right to counsel vis-a-vis the prior unrelated charge for which the defendant had
obtained counsel. See, e.g., People v. Robles, 72 N.Y.2d 689, 697, 533 N.E.2d 240, 244, 536
N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (1988) ("primary concern in Rogers was that questioning on unrelated
charges might interfere with the attorney-client relationship that existed with respect to the
pending charges"); People v. Colwell, 65 N.Y.2d 883, 885, 482 N.E.2d 1214, 1215, 493
N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (1985) (mem.) ("primary concern underlying Rogers was that a defendant
could incriminate himself on the pending charge, on which he is represented, even though
the questions ostensibly concern unrelated charges"). However, if the defendant's right to
counsel had attached on the prior unrelated charge, but he had not actually obtained an
attorney, the defendant is not protected by the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule. See People v.
Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 329, 420 N.E.2d 45, 48-49, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247, 251 (1981). A de-
fendant invoking the protection of the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule bears the burden of proving
that he was actually represented by counsel on the prior charge at the time of the interroga-
tion. People v. Rosa, 65 N.Y.2d 380, 387, 482 N.E.2d 21, 26, 492 N.Y.S.2d 542, 547 (1985).
Thus, this special right to counsel on the subsequent unrelated charge is not independent,
but is derivative and "accordingly limited in scope" and functions to "protect the direct and
full-fledged right to counsel in the pending proceeding." Robles, 72 N.Y.2d at 698, 533
N.E.2d at 244, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
Furthermore, the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule applies only to custodial interrogations.
Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d at 116, 480 N.E.2d at 64-65, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79. The test used to
determine whether an interrogation is custodial is "whether a reasonable person, innocent of
any crime, would have felt free to leave." People v. Wroblewski, 109 App. Div. 2d 39, 42, 489
N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (4th Dep't 1985), (quoting People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208, 215, 397
N.E.2d 733, 736, 422 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45 (1979)) afl'd, 67 N.Y.2d 933, 493 N.E.2d 943, 502
N.Y.S.2d 719, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 845 (1986). The use of an inculpatory statement elicited
under a noncustodial interrogation does not violate the defendant's right to counsel, even if
the police know that the defendant is represented on a prior unrelated charge. See People v.
Farruggia, 61 N.Y.2d 775, 777, 461 N.E.2d 295, 296, 473 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (1984).
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inquire into the defendant's representational status.' Some New
York courts have extended-expressly6 or implicitly 7-the applica-
bility of the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule to situations where the de-
fendant is represented by counsel on an unrelated prior charge
pending in a foreign jurisdiction." Recently, however, in People v.
Bing,9 the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the
rule extended only to cases where the defendant's unrelated prior
See Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 231-32, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897. If the
police fail to inquire into the defendant's representational status despite their actual knowl-
edge of the pending unrelated charge, they are charged with the knowledge which such an
inquiry would have disclosed. Id. at 232, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897. Thus, the
police would be "foreclosed either from questioning defendant or from accepting his waiver
of counsel's assistance unless his attorney was then present." Id.
In Bertolo, the Court of Appeals summarized the most "salient" factors in ascertaining
whether legal representation on a pending charge prohibits the use of a custodial interroga-
tion in the absence of counsel on a later unrelated charge. Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d at 118, 480
N.E.2d at 66-67, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 480-81. These factors are: "the extent of the police knowl-
edge; the proximity, severity and notoriety of the prior charges; and the good or bad faith of
the police." Id. at 118, 480 N.E.2d at 67, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 481. Thus, in applying the Rogers-
Bartolomeo rule, the Court of Appeals generally has not charged police with constructive
knowledge of a pending unrelated charge. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 61 N.Y.2d 932, 934,
463 N.E.2d 368, 370, 474 N.Y.S.2d 967, 969 (1984) (defendant's assertion that he had been
denied his constitutional right to counsel was rejected as no evidence indicated that police
had any knowledge of the prior criminal proceeding); People v. Green, 138 App. Div. 2d 516,
518, 525 N.Y.S.2d 905, 907 (2d Dep't 1988) (defendant had two charges pending in arresting
officer's precinct, yet officer's lack of actual knowledge of charges precluded application of
Rogers-Bartolomeo rule).
However, if various police agencies are conducting a joint investigation in which all had
the same actual knowledge or notice, actual knowledge may be "constructively imputed."
See People v. Fuschino, 59 N.Y.2d 91, 99, 450 N.E.2d 200, 203, 463 N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (1983)
(actual knowledge imputed when "two agencies are working so closely that it can be deemed
a joint investigation"). In addition, when the police have actual knowledge of a pending
charge they may not use an agent to question a defendant outside his counsel's presence in
order to circumvent the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule. See People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 161, 173,
441 N.E.2d 1057, 1061, 455 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543 (1982) (informer of state police held to be
agent of police), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983). There are circumstances, however, that
do not warrant application of the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule, even though it is shown that the
police had actual knowledge of a prior charge. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. But
see Note, Prior Representation and the Duty to Inquire: Breaching New York's "Once an
Attorney" Rule, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 259 (1988) (arguing that police should presume that
person with pending charge has counsel).
6 See, e.g., People v. Torres, 137 Misc. 2d 29, 36, 519 N.Y.S.2d 613, 617 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1987) ("inappropriate to hold that, merely because his other case was in a foreign
jurisdiction, the defendant should be entitled to any less protection").
See, e.g., People v. Mehan, 112 App. Div. 2d 482, 484, 490 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (3d Dep't
1985) (police obligated to inquire whether defendant had legal representation on unrelated
pending charges in another state where police had actual knowledge).
B See supra notes 6-7.
146 App. Div. 2d 178, 540 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't), appeal granted, 74 N.Y.2d 536,
543 N.E.2d 754, 545 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1989).
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charge is pending in New York. °
In Bing, Nassau County police detectives received a tip sug-
gesting that the defendant, Bruce Bing, had robbed the St. Joa-
chim's Church in Cedarhurst.11 In addition, the informant indi-
cated that Bing was wanted by the police in Ohio. 2 After
confirming the existence of an outstanding warrant for Bing's ar-
rest on a burglary charge in Ohio, the Nassau County detectives
arrested him on the basis of that warrant.' 3 During the car ride to
the precinct, Bing waived his right to counsel and made an incul-
patory statement regarding the church robbery.' 4 The detectives
never inquired as to whether Bing had retained counsel on the
Ohio charge.' 5 At his preliminary hearing, Bing moved to suppress
his inculpatory statement on the ground that the police failed to
inquire into his representational status, despite their knowledge of
the pending charge in Ohio. 16 The Supreme Court, Nassau County,
denied the motion and Bing subsequently pleaded guilty to the
church burglary.'7
The Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously af-
firmed Bing's conviction, holding that Bing's motion was properly
10 Id. at 179, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
" Id. at 179, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 247-48. On May 17, 1985, money was stolen from the
rectory safe and the rectory housekeeper herself was robbed. Id. at 179, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
While investigating the robbery, Detective Glenn Dowd received the tip regarding Bing from
Cecil Scott, a known informant. Id. at 179, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 247-48.
12 Id. at 179-80, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 248. Scott told Dowd that Bing had "recently arrived
from Ohio and that 'he was wanted, he was hot out in Ohio.'" Id.
13 Id. at 180, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 248. The police confirmed via teletype the existence of the
outstanding warrant for Bing in Mansfield, Ohio. Brief for Respondent at 2.
1 People v. Bing, 131 Misc. 2d 62, 63-64, 499 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1985). The defendant waived his right to counsel after receiving his Miranda warn-
ings. Id. Bing then admitted that he had committed the crime at St. Joachim's rectory and
that he was wanted in Ohio. Id. at 64, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
1 Bing, 146 App. Div. 2d at 180, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
"0 Id. The court, however, stated that such knowledge did not create a "duty to inquire
further, nor should the police be bound by what they would have learned from such in-
quiry." Bing, 131 Misc. 2d at 65, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 316; see also supra note 5 (police are
charged with knowledge that an inquiry into defendant's representational status would have
disclosed). Bing's waiver of counsel would have been ineffective if the court had concluded
that the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule was triggered by a pending, out-of-state charge. See People
v. Mehan, 112 App. Div. 2d 482, 484, 490 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (3d Dep't 1985) (Rogers-
Bartolomeo rule triggered by pending, out-of-state charge); People v. Torres, 137 Misc. 2d
29, 35-36, 519 N.Y.S.2d 613, 617 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987) (same).
17 Bing, 146 App. Div. 2d at 180, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 248. The court concluded that "[tihe
application of Rogers-Bartolomeo to the instant case would be an unreasonable overexten-
sion of that principle." Bing, 131 Misc. 2d at 66, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 316. Bing pleaded guilty to
first degree burglary. Bing, 146 App. Div. 2d at 180, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
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denied, as the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule does not apply if the unre-
lated prior charge is pending in another jurisdiction."8 Writing for
the court, Justice Brown explained that the rule was designed to
protect a defendant from divulging self-incriminating information,
in the absence of counsel, regarding the unrelated pending charge,
thereby compromising the defendant's right to counsel on that
prior charge.1 Thus, the right to counsel as contemplated by the
Rogers decision "is not independent, but is instead derived from
the existing attorney-client relationship, and is accordingly limited
in scope. ' 20 Concluding that New York's "interest in protecting the
defendant's rights vis-a-vis an unrelated case pending in a foreign
jurisdiction is minimal" and thus outweighed by the State's impor-
tant interest in law enforcement, the Appellate Division, Second
Department, rejected the proposed extension of the Rogers-
Bartolomeo rule previously advocated by the Third Department in
People v. Mehan21 and by a Supreme Court Justice within the
First Department in People v. Torres.22
Because great importance is attached to the successful investi-
gation and prosecution of criminal conduct, New York courts
should avoid placing unreasonable restrictions on police interroga-
tions.23 Consistent with this principle, the Court of Appeals has
weighed the State's law enforcement interest against the State's
interest in expanding a criminal defendant's right to counsel when
considering extentions of the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule.24 It is sub-
18 Bing, 146 App. Div. 2d at 248, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
,1 Id. at 183-84, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 250. The court relied on People v. Colwell, 65 N.Y.2d
883, 482 N.E.2d 1214, 493 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1985) (mem.), and People v. Robles, 72 N.Y.2d 689,
533 N.E.2d 240, 536 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1988), in determining the intent of the Rogers court.
20 Bing, 146 App. Div. 2d at 183, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (quoting Robles, 72 N.Y.2d at
697-98, 533 N.E.2d at 244, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 405). The court noted that the Rogers court
intended to protect the defendant on the charge for which he has counsel, not the charge for
which he is being questioned. See id.
2 112 App. Div. 2d 482, 490 N.Y.S.2d 897 (3d Dep't 1985).
22 137 Misc. 2d 29, 519 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987).
2 Cf. People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 328, 420 N.E.2d 45, 48-49, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247,
250-51 (1981) (charging police with knowledge of all warrants and accusatory instruments
incident to unrelated charges would "unnecessarily and unrealistically limit police interroga-
tion procedures"). The Court of Appeals has directed that, when considering the prerequi-
sites of the right to counsel, "[w]hat is required must always be considered in light of what
is practical under the circumstances." People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 464, 377 N.E.2d 721,
724, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268, 271 (1978).
2 People v. Colwell, 65 N.Y.2d 883, 885, 482 N.E.2d 1214, 1216, 493 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300
(1985) (mem.). The Colwell court explained that when considering an extension of Rogers,
"the State's significant interest in investigating and prosecuting criminal conduct" must be
considered. Id. (quoting Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22).
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mitted that the Bing court properly recognized that the extension
proposed by the defendant did not meet this standard.
The proposed extension to the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule would
sacrifice New York's important law enforcement interests by sup-
pressing otherwise admissible evidence in a New York criminal
proceeding in an attempt to protect the attorney-client relation-
ship between a defendant charged with a crime in another state
and his attorney in that jurisdiction.2" It is submitted that the pro-
tection of such foreign attorney-client relationships should be left
to the foreign jurisdiction's courts or legislature because the for-
eign jurisdiction has the greater interest in determining the extent
to which a criminal defendant's right to counsel should be pro-
tected in its proceedings. 26 Furthermore, the United States Consti-
The court concluded that any interest in expanding the Rogers rule to defendants repre-
sented by counsel throughout a protracted appeals process was "outweighed by the legiti-
mate interest in law enforcement."Id. Similarly, in People v. Lucarano, 61 N.Y.2d 138, 148,
460 N.E.2d 1328, 1333, 472 N.Y.S.2d 894, 898 (1984), the Court of Appeals recognized that
the "State's important interest in criminal investigations and the extent to which law en-
forcement efforts will be impeded by a contrary rule" must be considered in a decision re-
garding an expansion of Bartolomeo. Id. The court must balance the accused's right to
counsel with "the ability of police officers to discharge their increasingly difficult job [of]
protecting the law-abiding citizenry by obtaining voluntary confessions from suspects who
wish to offer them." People v. Patterson, 85 App. Div. 2d 698, 701, 445 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477
(2d Dep't 1981) (Weinstein, J., dissenting); see also Liberal Party of N.Y. v. Commission of
Investigation, 579 F. Supp. 755, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)("States, as a matter of law, have a
compelling interest in enforcing provisions of their criminal laws").
'5 See Bing, 146 App. Div. 2d at 183-84, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Rogers-Bartolomeo
designed to protect defendant with respect to unrelated prior charge as to which he is al-
ready represented by counsel).
26 Cf. In re Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 485-86, 236 N.E.2d 152, 156, 288 N.Y.S.2d
993, 998-99 (1968). The Court of Appeals has explained that "[a]s between two states, the
law of that one which has the predominant, if not the sole, interest in the protection and
regulation of the rights of the person or persons involved should, of course, be invoked." Id.
The Court of Appeals has also noted that "the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest
interest in the litigation [should] be applied." Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom,
Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 382, 248 N.E.2d 576, 582, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817, 825 (1969) (quoting Miller
v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 15-16, 237 N.E.2d 877, 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (1968)).This
principle is applicable to criminal cases. See People v. Benson, 88 App. Div. 2d 229, 231, 454
N.Y.S.2d 155, 157 (3d Dep't 1982). It is submitted that a jurisdiction enforcing its laws
through a criminal prosecution has the predominant interest in determining the extent to
which the defendant's right to counsel should be protected. Thus, it is further submitted
that by rejecting the proposed extension of the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule, New York would
properly defer to the jurisdiction having the predominant interest in the matter.
Other jurisdictions have overwhelmingly rejected the rationale behind the Rogers-
Bartolomeo rule and have concluded that a criminal defendant with counsel should not be
afforded any additional protection when facing an interrogation on an unrelated subsequent
charge. See Dillon, The Case for Reversing "The Rogers Rule" on the Right to Counsel, 58
N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 52 (July 1986); see e.g., United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 223 (2d
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tution provides safeguards against any state's abridgement of a
criminal defendant's guaranteed right to counsel.2 7 Thus, it is as-
serted that New York has only a minimal interest in protecting a
defendant's right to counsel in a foreign jurisdiction and therefore
the State should not attempt"8 to extend Rogers-Bartolomeo pro-
tection to jurisdictions that have chosen not to recognize such a
rule.
Cir. 1973) ("[t]he concept that professional criminals have 'house counsel' because of prior
escapades and that therefore Government agents knowing the identity of prior counzel have
an obligation of constitutional or even ethical dimension to contact counsel before question-
ing them, is hardly appealing"); People v. Mack, 89 Cal. App. 3d 974, 978-79, 152 Cal. Rptr.
882, 885 (1979) (defendant with counsel on prior unrelated crime can waive right to counsel
outside presence of that counsel since "interrogation of suspects could be delayed indefi-
nitely while the officers attempted to locate the suspect's counsel, notify him of the pro-
posed interview, and either obtain his consent thereto or permit his participation therein")
(quoting People v. Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 178, 187, 555 P.2d 297, 301, 133 Cal. Rptr. 511, 515
(1976)); Lofton v. State, 471 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defendant's state-
ments were not inadmissible "merely because public defender representing defendant in a
completely unrelated criminal matter was not notified prior to questioning"); State v. Ture,
353 N.W.2d 502, 511 (Minn. 1984) (rejected New York's Rogers approach as it "turns on the
fortuity that a suspect has been charged on an unrelated offense before interrogation takes
place"); State v. Porter, 210 N.J. Super. 383, 393, 510 A.2d 49, 54 (1986) ("restrictions on
interrogation should be no different merely because the defendant was represented in an-
other matter"). Thus, the proposed extension of the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule would result in
New York sacrificing its law enforcement interests to protect foreign attorney-client rela-
tionships, see supra notes 4 & 24, though foreign jurisdictions appear to be resoundingly
opposed to providing such protection themselves. See Dillon, supra, at 52.
27 See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687 (1988) (sixth amendment prohibits
police from interrogating defendant after request for counsel, even if interrogation concerns
separate investigation); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963)(in all criminal prose-
cutions, state or federal, accused shall have right to assistance of counsel). But see Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (dictum) ("to exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to
which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was
obtained, simply because other charges were pending at that time, would unnecessarily frus-
trate the public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities").
28 It is submitted that the proposed extension of the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule would not
guarantee the intended protection to defendants. The rule does not bar questioning of a
defendant concerning unrelated pending charges, but rather prohibits "the information ob-
tained through that questioning in the absence of counsel" to be used against the defendant.
People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173 n.2, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713 n.2 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 22 n.2
(1979). Since Rogers and Bartolomeo are not binding on other states, it is suggested that a
New York police officer could properly testify in another state regarding inculpatory state-
ments made by a defendant concerning a prior charge in that state. However, this same
police officer's testimony as to a defendant's inculpatory statements regarding a subsequent
unrelated charge in New York would be inadmissible in New York because of the Rogers-
Bartolomeo rule. See id. at 172-73, 397 N.E.2d at 712-13, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22. Thus, it is
submitted that New York would be sacrificing valuable evidence otherwise admissible in
this State to "protect" the defendant's right to counsel on the pending out-of-state charge,
while that state may permit the admission of the very evidence the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule
is designed to exclude.
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Furthermore, it is submitted that practical difficulties would
result from such an extension. An out-of-state attorney not admit-
ted to practice in New York could not lawfully advise his client in
New York.2 In addition, requiring exhaustive nationwide searches
to determine the representational status of an arrestee would un-
duly impede police investigations." Moreover, the proposed exten-
sion would further immunize recidivist offenders from police ques-
tioning in subsequent investigations absent their counsel from the
prior charge.3 '
Finally, it is suggested that the Torres court's reliance on "the
established line of New York cases which strictly and scrupulously
guard defendant's right to counsel"3 2 as justification for extending
the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule constituted an inappropriately broad
reading of the rule. Though the New York courts have zealously
protected the criminal defendant's right to counsel,3 the Court of
Appeals has repeatedly held that the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule is
not absolute, and has refused to apply the rule in certain situations
29 See Spivack v. Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 166, 211 N.E.2d 329, 330, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953, 955
(1965) ("settled that the practice of law forbidden in this State... includes legal advice and
counsel"); 18 Int'l Ltd. v. Interstate Express, Inc., 116 Misc. 2d 66, 67, 455 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (representation in New York by attorney not admitted and
licensed in New York is, under most circumstances, unlawful); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 478 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1989).
30 Abramovsky, The Rogers-Bartolomeo Rule, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1989 at 3, col. 3; see
also People v. Lucarano, 61 N.Y.2d 138, 147, 460 N.E.2d 1328, 1332, 472 N.Y.S.2d 894, 898
(1984) (recognizing "practical limitations" to obligations imposed upon investigating author-
ities; police not required to undertake "exhaustive inquiries").
"1 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. (Mehan and Torres courts advocate ex-
tending Rogers-Bartolomeo rule to situations where defendant's prior charge is pending in
foreign jurisdiction, thereby preventing police from effectively interrogating any defendant
they knew had pending charge in any other state unless defendant waived his right to coun-
sel in presence of his attorney). In his dissenting opinion in Bartolomeo, Judge Wachtler
stated, "[ilt is the common criminal, not the one-time offender, who nearly always will man-
age to have at least one serious charge pending, so that the attorney in the picture can
provide him with virtual immunity from questioning in subsequent investigations."
Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 239, 423 N.E.2d at 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (Wachtler, J., dis-
senting); see also People v. Smith, 54 N.Y.2d 954, 956, 429 N.E.2d 823, 824, 445 N.Y.S.2d
145, 146 (1981) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (defendant enjoyed "special protection" because
he had been charged with sodomy prior to committing murder).
12 People v. Torres, 137 Misc. 2d 29, 35-36, 519 N.Y.S.2d 613, 617 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1987). The Torres court reasoned that it would be "inappropriate" to limit the Rog-
ers-Bartolomeo rule "merely because [defendant's] case was in a foreign jurisdiction" in
light of this "established line" of cases. See id. The Appellate Division, Third Department,
without any discussion or citation of authority, concluded that the rule should be extended.
See People v. Mehan, 112 App. Div. 2d 482, 484, 490 N.Y.2d 897, 899 (3d Dep't 1985).
" See supra note 1.
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
despite a defendant's retention of counsel on an unrelated pending
charge.3 4
While a defendant's right to counsel must be safeguarded, it
also "must be tempered with reason and common sense."' 5
Whereas New York has a significant interest in promoting proper
criminal investigations, it has a minimal interest in protecting a
defendant's right to counsel in a foreign state's proceeding."6 New
York investigations should not be unduly encumbered by pending
prosecutions in foreign jurisdictions. Such foreign jurisdictions re-
tain the right to determine-based on their own standards and
those of the federal Constitution-whether a New York investiga-
tion violated the defendant's right to counsel. Keeping these con-
siderations in mind, along with the practical difficulties associated
with the proposed extension of the rule, it is urged that the New
York Court of Appeals reject such an extension.37
Thomas J. Cahill
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 4504(a): A plaintiff in a personal injury action cannot ef-
fect a waiver of the defendant's physician-patient privilege by
placing the defendant's physical condition "in controversy"
U See, e.g., People v. Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d 111, 480 N.E.2d 61, 490 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1985)
(police knew defendant had been arrested on minor charges several months earlier, but had
no knowledge that charges were still pending and that defendant was represented by coun-
sel on charges); People v. Colwell, 65 N.Y.2d 883, 482 N.E.2d 1214, 493 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1985)'
(mem.) (police were aware that defendant was represented on appeal for prior conviction);
People v. Lucarano, 61 N.Y.2d 138, 460 N.E.2d 1328, 472 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1984) (defendant
denied having counsel on pending unrelated charge, though defendant was in fact repre-
sented on charge); People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187, 461 N.E.2d 276, 473 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1984)
(police were aware that defendant was represented but emergency situation existed).
11 Bing, 131 Misc. 2d 62, 66, 499 N.Y.S.2d 313, 316 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1985). As
Justice Cardozo noted: "[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament." Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
11 See Bing, 146 App. Div. 2d at 184, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
37 On March 20, 1990, the New York Court of Appeals heard oral argument on Mr.
Bing's appeal from the Second Department's decision in People v. Bing, 146 App. Div. 2d
178, 540 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1989).
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